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Research Unit for Epistemology, Metaphysics, and Philosophy of Cognition


The unit coordinates research on interrelated issues in analytical epistemology, metaphysics, and philosophy of cognition. Currently prominent research questions within the unit concern modal conditions for knowledge and knowledge of modality, epistemic norms, dispositions and response-dependence, non-representational theories of cognition, process ontology, the role of intuitions and conceivability for modal cognition, mathematical knowledge, scientific realism, naturalism, and pragmatism.

The unit has a strong international profile, with solid ties to several of the worlds most prominent research centers in the field. 

The unit arranges a permanent research seminar with weekly meetings during term time, with a university-wide following, and often hosts workshops and conferences.

Please contact the coordinator of the unit if you wish to get involved!

Unit Coordinator

Events Fall 2019

All seminars take place Fridays at 12:30–14:30 in 1467/616


Sept 6:

Jan Faye: How Matter Becomes Conscious—A Naturalistic Theory of the Mind

Sept 20:

Asger Kirkeby-Hinrup (TBA)

Sept 27:

Rasmus Jaksland, University of Trondheim, Norway

How is Science Metaphysically Possible? An Apology for Conflicts Between Metaphysics and Science

Oct 4:

Karen Broecker’s PhD defense of Justifying the evidential use of intuitive judgements in linguistics (w/ Michael Devitt).

Oct 5:

Workshop on scientific realism with Michael Devitt

Oct 11:

Jack Wood, University of Leeds, UK


Oct 15-16:

Workshop on Experimental Philosophy of Science. More details here: http://projects.au.dk/intuitions/workshop-xphisci-2019/

Nov. 8:

Mitch Green, Univ of Connecticut (TBA)

Nov. 15:

Carl-Erik Kühl: A Taxonomy of Forgetting and Remembering.

Nov. 22:

Jeroen Smid, Lund University /Manchester University

Mind the Gap! The Space between Coincidence and Colocation 

Abstract: One question in the metaphysics of material objects is whether distinct objects can have the same proper parts, i.e. coincide. Another question is whether distinct objects can have the same location, i.e. be colocated. These debates are often conflated in the sense that colocated objects are tacitly taken to be coincident, too. I argue that this is a mistaken since there are at least two ways of allowing for colocation without coincidence. This means one can have a mereology where coincidence is banned without having to deny that some objects can, or even are, colocated.