The workshop is designed to address the prospects for advancing research in practical philosophy. As such, the workshop papers and presentations will address various ways in which the simulatory capacities of AI-driven social robots enhance our inclinations to attribute to them intentions, emotions, consciousness, etc. and examine how this attribution not only will but is already necessitating a range of real-world practical solutions to robot moral status and rights. In order to address these issues, the workshop will assemble a team of researchers from across the globe and from different disciplines, who can bring to this conversation a wide range of viewpoints and methods of investigation. By doing so, the workshop will facilitate and stage a wide-ranging conversation about the practical aspects of robot rights that will help conference attendees not only understand the current state of research and development in this area but also assist them in formulating their own thinking about and research into these important and timely matters.

Legal rights for autonomous systems have been debated since the term "robot" was introduced in Capek's R.U.R. Today, with technological and legal advancements, the discussion on AI's legal rights has moved beyond science fiction to academic and legislative arenas.

While debates often focus on the sentience or consciousness of AI, legal subjectivity is not solely tied to these traits. For instance, despite being unconscious, newborns have legal rights, while sentient beings like chimps may not.

Arendt argues that legal subjectivity results from a social contract that emerges when individuals come together based on trust and mutual equality. Therefore, it is crucial to admit non-human beings, including AI systems, into communities such as states or international organizations for them to have legal rights. The legal subjectivity of AI, like other non-human entities, depends on people including AI systems in their network of relationships. Without such acceptance, legal rights for AI will remain elusive, regardless of the consciousness of AI.

This paper discusses the impact of morphology on the legal situation of robots. I will argue that choosing human-like morphology puts robots in a privileged position compared to robots with non-human morphologies. Robots with the same types of features but in different shapes should be treated differently. I will focus on the representational aspects of robots, showing that human shape in the robot design brings extra burdens on users. Mistreating humanoid robots could be degrading for humans, who such behaviors could indirectly and sometimes directly harm. To ensure the safety of humans, humanoid robots should be protected more than other types of robots.

This paper explores the concept of robot rights as societal imperatives—constraints established by collective normative authority. We argue that rights, including those of robots, are societal regulations rather than inherent individual attributes like autonomy or consciousness. These rights aim to regulate behavior for communal harmony and reflect collective power, with right holders acting as proxies. For instance, rights for sex robots arise from concerns about normalizing abusive behaviors toward humans.  

We propose that granting rights to robots, akin to any object forming social bonds with humans, is part of human self-domestication. This perspective diverges from the “should-could” framework of the robot rights debate, suggesting that robot rights facilitate orderly coexistence in complex societies where even objects can interact. 

Our thesis emphasizes that expanding normative scope goes beyond being merely a restriction of individual freedom, representing also a naturalization of societal limitations for mutual coexistence. The growing collective control and authority represented by robot rights illustrate human cultural evolution aimed at maintaining societal stability against disruptive human tendencies.

This paper examines American pragmatism as a lens through which to navigate the landscape of robot rights, bridging theory and practice. We draw inspiration from pragmatism's commitment to resolving seemingly interminable philosophical dilemmas and its unapologetic drive for amelioration, particularly relevant in today's landscape where emerging social technologies hold the potential to either alleviate or exacerbate issues of abuse and inequity. Although the pragmatist tradition encompasses varied figures—e.g., Pierce, James, Dewey, Rorty, and West—, there are broad points of convergence among its major strains, including pluralism, nondualism, an emphasis on the materiality of language, relationality, and meliorism. These tendencies establish links to the “relational turn,” underscoring the importance of relational entanglement and social context to considerations of robot rights. An intriguing aspect we delve into is the pragmatist conflation of truth with goodness, blurring the lines between 'ought' and 'is.' We pose questions about what it means to determine what is practically expedient or favorable in our thoughts and actions regarding the social meaning and treatment of robots. Further, we explore issues of inclusivity, ethical considerations, the contingency of truths in discursive systems, and the construction of a pragmatic methodology tailored to the realm of robot rights

While the discourse on robot rights has gained scholarly attention in recent years, it remains a subject of polarization. Skeptics often contest the idea that robots could possess moral status and rights, while proponents argue that artificial entities might evolve into “suprapersons” endowed with even stronger rights than those of humans. This paper aims to bring clarity to this debate by critically examining the underlying assumptions on both sides, particularly within the framework of the human rights approach. To achieve this objective, three aspects of the problem are considered: 1) The foundational assumptions underpinning human rights; 2) The implications of these assumptions for future robots; and 3) The main practical challenges associated with recognizing robots as bearers of human rights. The analysis suggests that intelligent robots could, theoretically, acquire moral rights in general and human rights in particular under certain plausible assumptions. However, the substantial dissimilarities between humans and robots (e.g., in terms of the internal architecture) pose significant epistemic challenges. These challenges are bound to complicate the practical application of the approach, making it difficult to distinguish genuine artificial rights-holders from mere robotic moral zombies.