When Denmark assumes the EU presidency on July 1st, it will do so in a Union that has changed significantly since 1973 — the year Denmark joined the European Communities and also held the presidency for the first time.

Back then, it was called the European Communities (EC). The cooperation was primarily economic, with only nine Western European member states. Today, the EU is a political union of 27 countries, with strengthened common institutions, a shared currency in most member states, and increasing joint responsibilities in areas such as climate, security, digital regulation, and the handling of global crises.

Despite these differences, historical echoes remain strong — especially in the relationship between the United States and Europe. The U.S. is once again turning its attention to Europe, calling for greater responsibility from its European allies. This creates an interesting parallel to 1973, when — according to Professor of History at Aarhus University, Thorsten Borring Olesen — the U.S. sought to pressure the EC countries to take on more of the common security burden.

“The year 1973 is quite fascinating because the U.S. government declared it the ‘Year of Europe’ — without involving Europe or the EC in the launch. The goal was to get the EC countries to shoulder a larger share of Europe’s security burden at a time when the United States was economically weakened and politically affected by the Vietnam War,” says historian Thorsten Borring Olesen.
The initiative came from President Nixon’s national security advisor, Henry Kissinger. With the "Year of Europe," the U.S. aimed to revitalize the transatlantic alliance — and at the same time signal that the time had come for Europe to take more responsibility.

This American initiative coincided with another major development: the EC’s first enlargement.

The Enlargement Played a Key Role in the American Initiative

In 1973, the EC was enlarged by three new member states — Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom.

“The enlargement of the EC played a significant role in the American initiative. In Henry Kissinger’s argument, the U.S. had helped rebuild (Western) Europe after World War II, including by supporting and promoting the process of European integration. According to Kissinger, this had made Europe stronger — and even more so now in 1973 with the UK joining. The problem with the American approach was that the U.S., perhaps justifiably, wanted Europe to contribute more to transatlantic defense, but at the same time was unwilling to accept the political consequences of Europe’s new strength.”
Many of these dynamics are resurfacing today in a new geopolitical reality.

The U.S. Once Again Wants Europe to Do More for Its Own Defense

In 1973, according to the history professor, there were strong voices calling for the EC countries to strengthen their security cooperation — possibly with a real defense dimension — as part of the Year of Europe.

“That idea, however, was buried because several countries feared it would weaken the NATO alliance. At the same time, countries like West Germany, the Netherlands, and Denmark explicitly rejected the idea of the EC developing into a superpower,” he explains, while also pointing to clear differences between the U.S. approach then and now.
From an American perspective, the Year of Europe did not achieve its intended effect:

“The Year of Europe turned out to be a clear failure — the Americans did not get what they hoped for in terms of a relaunch of the transatlantic alliance. But in 1974, the partnership was reaffirmed through the so-called Ottawa Declaration. In other words, the Americans and Kissinger settled for the status quo. They did so because the U.S. still needed its European allies during the Cold War — and because there were, after all, clear benefits to remaining the ‘leader of the pack,’ so to speak.”

A More Fragile Alliance Today

Today, the situation looks very different — especially under Trump, where the unity of NATO appears more uncertain.

“Today, under Trump, that seems no longer to be enough. There is an unpredictable but also genuine fear that the alliance could fall apart — triggered by some American pretext or action. Disagreements over Ukraine or Greenland could be such examples. Added to this is the erosion of democracy and the political drift toward authoritarianism under Trump, which threatens the shared values that have helped keep the alliance alive.”

Contact
Thorsten Borring Olesen, Professor
Department of History
School of Culture and Society
Aarhus University
Phone: +45 51211348
Email: histbo@cas.au.dk